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Ethnic Partisanship in Ethiopia

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Ethnic identity is often cited as an important variable explaining voter choices in Africa. Ethiopia, since 1994, has adopted an ethnically-based federal system, which makes it an interesting test case of the importance of ethnicity in shaping voter preferences. Indeed, one might expect higher levels of ethnification of voter preferences in Ethiopia when compared to other African countries. Using cross-national data from the World Values Survey and Afrobarometer, it is found that Ethiopian voters have relatively higher levels of concentrated partisan support than do other African countries. However, when examining the propensity of individual voters to express partisan preferences that “defect” from their ethnic position, I find that the evaluations of government performance explain defections better than does the intensity of ethnic identity or expectations for patronage.

Many scholars have worried that elections in ethnically-divided societies will produce “census elections” that are inimical to democracy. This is because such elections tend to create impermeable blocs that detract from interethnic accommodation. Rather than creating harmony and stability, elections in ethnically-divided societies become an invitation to fraud and open conflict, as groups struggle for political dominance.¹ The most common explanation for census-style elections is Donald Horowitz’s expressive voting hypothesis, which contends that voters employ the act of voting to express (and hence to register) their identities as part of an ethnic group.² This in turn gives rise to ethnic parties, which, through the process of ethnic outbidding, leads to the hardening of ethnic positions, reducing the possibility of ethnic accommodation and ultimately leads to the dissolution of incipient democracies. This approach suggests that voters relate to parties in two ways. First, ethnic voters will tend to support parties that represent their ethnic interests

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and, second, that ethnic voters will concentrate their support on particular parties, especially if there is a hardening of ethnic positions as the result of outbidding.

An interesting test case for the development of ethnic partisan identities among voters is Ethiopia. In 1994, the new regime in Ethiopia instituted an ethnically-based federal system (in part modeled after the Soviet example of ethnic federalism) where the federation was extensively reorganized along ethnic lines. Formerly multiethnic provinces were combined into nine ethnic regions (with the capital Addis Ababa as a special administrative unit), and significant powers were devolved to the regional level. Given these changes, one might expect that the explicit institutional ethnification of Ethiopian politics would lead to the overall ethnification of Ethiopian political behavior.

In this article, two different sets of questions are addressed regarding ethnic voters in Ethiopia. First, along the cross-national dimension, how do voters in Ethiopia compare to voters in other ethnically-divided African states (such as Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, and Uganda)? Are ethnic groups in Ethiopia more or less likely to concentrate their votes on particular parties than in other countries (a sign of the ethnification of the party system)? Second, when comparing across ethnic groups in Ethiopia are some groups more likely to concentrate their support than other groups? Further, do ethnic voters in Ethiopia tend to support parties that purportedly represent their ethnic interests, or does the evaluation of economic or government performance better explain voter partisan preferences in Ethiopia than ethnic identity?³

Although Ethiopia, since 1991, has generally not qualified as a competitive democracy (with Polity 2 scores of around 1 since 2000), in 2005 there was a “thaw” of sorts. Under pressure from the international community, the Ethiopian government allowed for a relatively open campaign leading up to the May 2005 parliamentary elections (legislative elections are more critical in Ethiopia than elsewhere in Africa, given that it is one of the only parliamentary systems in Africa). Thus, a window opened to examine for the first time the partisan preferences of Ethiopian voters. Further, in 2005, the first systematic survey of 1500 respondents in Ethiopia was conducted for the World Values Survey project (the data were released in 2008) providing the first real opportunity to examine the ethnification of Ethiopian politics at the individual level. In this article, this data is used to address the questions posed above.

LITERATURE

There has been a growing literature on voting behavior and partisanship in Africa since the widespread adoption of multiparty elections in Africa over the past two decades.⁴ Generally, these studies have examined the explanations for partisanship, the intensity of partisanship, and the level of

support for the governing party. A prominent theme among scholars studying partisanship in Africa is the enduring relevance of ethnicity, where “ethnic ties based on kinship and family, language and dialect, tribal customs and local communities, as well as shared religious faiths, have long been regarded as playing a critical role in party politics.”⁵ Indeed it has long been held that the role of ethnicity in structuring voter alignments is important in that, as Donald Horowitz argues, in countries where ascribed ethnic loyalties are strong, “deeply riven along a preponderant ethnic cleavage—as in many Asian and African states—[there is a tendency] to throw up party systems that exacerbate ethnic conflict.”⁶ For some, like Letitia Lawson, ethnicity is an alternative basis for party mobilization and an almost natural process in Africa; given the “absence of formal associations clearly apart from the state and capable of engaging the population, the introduction of liberal democratic procedures, at the behest of external donors, has led political parties to appeal to the only available alternative: ethnic identity.”⁷ Given the often-cited importance of ethnicity in African party politics, this would suggest that, at the individual level, African voters should exhibit partisan preferences that align with ethnic identities.

While there is a general consensus that ethnicity is an important cleavage in many African cases, there has been considerable debate over the issue of *why* voters appear to vote along ethnic lines.⁸ Some have argued that voters vote for ethnic candidates because they believe that “their” candidates will deliver patronage resources to them. For instance Kanchan Chandra argues that ethnic voting is often the product of “patronage democracies,” in which the state monopolizes access to jobs and administrative resources.⁹ Such states, in the search for legitimation and popular support, often engage in “selective targeting” where certain groups are selected to receive most benefits from state resources. Hence, voters vote largely out of the expectation of patronage benefits. In this way ethnic identity offers an informational “shortcut” for voters, that voting for a co-ethnic candidate or party will more likely result in benefits for the voter, more so than voting for a candidate or party from another ethnic group. Voters believe that the benefits are more likely to result from demonstrating solidarity with the community, or the sense “that only a member of their own ethnic group may end up defending the interests of the ethnic group as a whole, and that voting for a member of another ethnic group will certainly not do so.”¹⁰ Of course this would also suggest that the most ambitious voters (that is, those that are most motivated to seek access to patronage benefits) who sense real opportunities for access to patronage by supporting non-co-ethnic parties (particularly if there is little chance that “your” ethnic party would win the election) would be most likely to “defect” from supporting a co-ethnic party.

A second approach emphasizes voter evaluations of the performance of the government. Indeed, it may be the case that what appears to be an ethnic bond among voters is actually because voters share common policy preferences that drive them to vote in similar ways. For instance, Robert

Mattes notes that in divided societies individuals from the same ethnic group have common preferences because they often share common political and economical interests.¹¹ Since preferences form as the result of social interactions, and individuals within ethnic communities tend to interact only with other members of their own group, this results in shared patterns of interests. Thus, it may appear that ethnicity is the cause of voting behavior, but in reality ethnicity is merely a correlate of other interests, particularly evaluations of governmental performance. Karen Ferree refers to this as the “policy framework” approach where voting is driven not by identity but by a common set of interests and a common set of policy evaluations.¹² Michael Bratton and Ravi Bhavnani refer to this approach when they argue that voting in Africa is as motivated by evaluations of government performance as it is by ethnic identity.¹³ Indeed, as they note, voter choice often appears to be primarily reflective of ethnic identity, when it is actually reflective of a common set of frustrations with government performance. In this situation, ethnicity plays no direct role in shaping voting behavior. That ethnicity overlaps with behavior is largely happenstance.

Finally, there is the “ethnic expressive voting” approach that suggests voters vote for co-ethnic candidates because the act of voting itself is a psychological affirmation of group identity. The most prominent advocate of this approach is Donald Horowitz.¹⁴ Horowitz argues that the very act of voting for an ethnic party is to affirm group identity, and voters derive psychological benefits from supporting ethnic parties. Since voting is not a product of rational calculation, partisan allegiances are rather fixed and rigid, and elections become a reflection of demographics.¹⁵ Such voting implies that voting is not the outcome of a careful evaluation of policy positions or the performance of leaders; instead, it is identity that matters. As Stanley Fish notes, at the heart of identity politics is when voters vote for or against someone because of the candidate’s personal characteristics; “in essence, identity politics is an affirmation of tribe against the claims of ideology.”¹⁶ This would suggest then, that individuals who feel this intensity more than others would be much less likely to defect from supporting a co-ethnic party than individuals who feel this identity less intensely.

However, recent empirical tests of ethnic voting in Africa have been rather mixed.¹⁷ This is not particularly surprising given that earlier observers of African elections noted the readiness of voters to turn against their representatives, even those from their own ethnic groups, for failing to deliver developmental goods and services.¹⁸ Some have argued that ethnicity plays a decisive influence on voter choices, more so than economic considerations.¹⁹ Others have argued that economic considerations, particularly voter evaluations of government performance, have a more powerful effect on voters than ethnic ties.²⁰

More recently, the literature has suggested that rather than mutually exclusive explanations for voting behavior in Africa, *both* ethnic identity and

economic factors are important in explaining voter choice. Ferree, in her study of voting in South Africa, found support for the idea that voters use ethnicity for informational cues.²¹ However, she found little support for the expressive voting thesis, and no support for the policy voting framework. This finding is also supported by the work of Ishiyama and Fox.²² They found that the strength of ethnic identity (across 12 countries) was unrelated to partisan voting in most cases (except for Malawi). Rather, like Chandra, Posner, and Ferree, they argue that voters may expect that leaders who are members of their own ethnic or tribal community are more likely to dispense patronage to them than leaders who are not. However, this *does* mean that ethnicity is *not the only consideration* in explaining partisan attachment. Bratton and Bhavnani, using data from 16 African electoral democracies argue that competitive elections in Africa are more than mere ethnic censuses—African voters engage in both ethnic *and* economic voting.²³ What really matters is the position of the group in the social and political hierarchy. People who belong to the ethnic group in power exhibit ethnic voting, as do those who feel a sense of discrimination against their cultural group. However, most others consider policy performance of the government and express their voting preferences accordingly (outside of those who are in power or those who feel discriminated against); thus, rather than being competing explanations, *both* ethnic identities and economic interests enter into the voting calculus of African voters.

Although there has been a growing amount of empirical work on African voters, relatively little work has been done on Ethiopia.²⁴ As mentioned above, Ethiopia has instituted a system of ethnic federalism, where the country's administrative units were organized along explicitly ethnic lines. This might suggest that ethnic voting would be more strongly pronounced in Ethiopia as compared to other African states. However, until very recently, no systematic survey data have been available on Ethiopia. However, in 2005 around the time of the parliamentary elections, the World Values Survey (WVS) conducted a study of 1500 respondents. In this article, using the data from the WVS study, I test: (1) whether Ethiopian voters express party preferences along ethnic lines more so than other African voters (a potential effect of ethnic federalism); (2) whether voters make choices merely based upon ethnic identity, or whether evaluation of policy performance or the expectation of material benefits, via patronage, better explain the behavior of Ethiopian voters.

BACKGROUND: ETHNICITY AND POLITICS IN POST-1991 ETHIOPIA

Ethiopia's population is highly diverse. Although it is widely argued that the three largest groups—the Oromo, Amhara, and Tigray—make up more than

three fourths of the population, according to the latest census, the Oromo make up 34.49% of the population, the Amhara 26.89%, the Somali 6.2%, and the Tigray 6.07%.²⁵ There are also more than 80 different ethnic groups within Ethiopia. Historically, the Amhara have been the politically and economically dominant group. More recently, the Tigray (who like the Amhara, speak a Semitic language, although from the impoverished northern region) have become the politically dominant group after the victory of the Tigray People's Liberation Front over the Marxist Leninist Derg government in 1991, and its ascendancy to power. The Oromo (who speak a Cushitic language that is very different from the Semitic Amharic and Tigragna languages of the North) have historically been the subordinate group in Ethiopian economics and politics.

In 1991, the Marxist Leninist Derg regime (which was largely dominated by members of the Amhara group) was overthrown by the Tigrayan Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) led by Meles Zenawi. The TPLF had been formed by Tigrayan leftist students who sought the independence of the Tigray region from Ethiopia. However, eventually the original aim of Tigrayan independence was abandoned when the TPLF formed the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in order to depose the Derg regime.

In 1991, following the collapse of Derg rule, Ethiopia established a federal system creating largely ethnic-based territorial units. The development of an ethnic-based federalism was consistent with the traditional program of the TPLF (which had favored the self-determination of ethnic groups during the war against the Derg) and its framers claimed that only through ethnic and regional autonomy would it be possible to maintain the Ethiopian state as a unified political unit. The initial process of federalization lasted four years and was formalized in a new constitution in 1995.²⁶ The traditional Ethiopian provinces were recombined into nine ethnic-based regional states and two federally administered city-states. The regional states that formed the federation in 1991 were: (1) Tigray; (2) Afar; (3) Amhara; (4) Oromiya; (5) Somali; (6) Benishangul-Gumuz; (7) Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples Region (a merger of five regions); (8) Gambella; and (9) Harari. Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa were made federal cities with a special status. The result has been the development of an asymmetric federation that combines populous regions states like Oromiya and Amhara in the central highlands with sparsely populated and underdeveloped ones like Gambella and Somali. Although the constitution vests all powers not attributed to the federal government in them, the regional states are in fact quite weak and subject to political manipulation by the central state.²⁷

The governing EPRDF reflects to some extent this federal structure. It is currently an alliance of four groups, including the Oromo People's Democratic Organization, the Amhara National Democratic Movement, the South Ethiopian People's Democratic Front, and the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front. All four regional-ethnic parties were created by the TPLF when it

created EPRDF in 1991. In reality, members of parliament from these parties consistently vote with TPLF and have no real independence outside the direction of TPLF.

The EPRDF since 1991 has pursued policies of economic liberalization and the promotion of ethnic federalism. The former has provided for the creation of a fairly vibrant market economy and rapid increases in foreign investment. However, liberalization has also been accompanied by charges of ethnic favoritism and cronyism. Further, although the ruling EPRDF has asserted that it is intent on addressing the claims of ethnic groups to build a multiethnic democracy, critics have bemoaned the financial costs of implementing parallel political and economic institutions across Ethiopia's reorganized ethnic "states" and are concerned about the threat ethnic divisions present to Ethiopian unity. There also remains considerable suspicion among Amharic-speaking elites in the cities about the Meles government. For instance, it is widely suspected that Meles is more interested in forwarding the interests of ethnic Tigrayans than he is in preserving Ethiopian unity.

It was within this context that the current Ethiopian opposition parties have emerged. Although there are many parties registered at both the national and regional levels, only recently has the opposition coalesced into a viable opposition that could challenge the EPRDF. In 2003, the United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (or UEDF, sometimes known as *Hebret*) was formed in Washington, DC and comprised five Ethiopia-based and nine exile opposition groups. The principal parties in the UEDF were the Ethiopian Social Democratic Federal Party (ESDFP—formerly the Coalition of Alternative Forces for Peace and Democracy in Ethiopia), the Oromo National Congress (ONC), the United Ethiopia Democratic Party (UEDP), the Southern Ethiopia Peoples' Democratic Coalition (SEPDC), and the All-Amhara People's Organization (AAPPO). Other parties that joined to create the UEDF are: Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front (ARDUF), All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement (MEISON), Council of Alternative Forces for Peace and Democracy (CAF-PDE), Ethiopian Democratic Union—Tehadiso (EDU Tehadiso), Ethiopian National United Front (ENUF), Ethiopian People Federal Democratic Unity Party (HIBREHIZB), Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP), Gambella People's United Democratic Front, (ONC), Oromo People's Liberation Organization (OPLO—IBSO), SEPDC, and Tigrean Alliance for Democracy (TAND). Generally, the UEDF advocates greater autonomy for the ethnic regions and for more power to be shifted to the various ethnic groups.

The other major opposition group in Ethiopian politics in 2005 was the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD— or *Kinijit*). It was formed by four new political parties in 2004. It consisted of the All Ethiopia Unity Party (AEUP), the Ethiopian Democratic League (EDL), the Ethiopian Democratic Unity Party-Medhin (EDUP-M), and the Rainbow Alliance/Movement for Democracy and Social Justice. The coalition contained parties with differing views regarding economical and political management ranging from

social democrats to economic liberals. The CUD emphasized the risks involved in the system of ethnic federalism that could lead to a disintegration of Ethiopia, and therefore was campaigning for a recentralization. The coalition had strong support in the Amhara region and Addis Ababa.

The EPRDF, UEDF, and CUD were the main contenders in the 15 May 2005 parliamentary elections.²⁸ Previous elections in 1995 and 2000 had not been competitive and were largely symbolic affairs, with the EPRDF controlling the overwhelming majority of seats in the national legislature. However, on 15 May 2005, Ethiopia held its third general election for seats in national parliamentary elections. Under considerable pressure from the international community, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi promised that this election would be fully democratic and invited international observers from the European Union and the U.S.-based Carter Center. Turnout was around 90 percent. The National Election Board announced that official results would be released on 8 June and that initial returns indicated that the ruling EPRDF had won over 300 seats; although the opposition parties had won all 23 seats in the capital city, Addis Ababa. The CUD and UEDF claimed that they had won enough seats to form a government and claimed massive electoral fraud. Antigovernment demonstrations erupted in the capital in early June and were met with violent suppression by security forces, resulting in the death of over 30 student protesters. On 8 July, the NEBE released the first official results for 307 of the 527 national parliamentary seats. Of the 307 seats, the EPRDF had won 139, while CUD and UEDF won 93 and 42, respectively. Smaller parties and independent candidates won the remaining 33 seats. Both the CUD and UEDF, which had agreed in June to a truce with the EPRDF, continued to allege massive electoral fraud had stolen the election. The opposition parties decided to boycott the related 21 August elections in the Somali Region. On 5 September, the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) released its final results, in which the EPRDF retained its control of the government with 327 seats, or 59 percent of the vote. Opposition parties won 174 seats, or 32 percent of the vote. The CUD alone won 20 percent of the vote.

ANALYSIS

Although, ultimately, the EPRDF retained power, the 2005 election was far more competitive than expected and the freedom of expression that was allowed prior to the election was unprecedented. It was during this period that the first systematic survey of Ethiopian voters was conducted under the auspices of the World Values Survey (WVS) project. The Ethiopian project sampled 1500 respondents employing a multistage random selection procedure and was the first broadly representative, publicly available, and systematic survey of the political attitudes of Ethiopians.²⁹ Although the WVS has collected data for several African states, only for Ethiopia (and Ghana)

does the data distinguish between particular ethnic groups (as opposed to merely identifying racial groups). Although not without its own sampling limitations (Amhara are slightly overrepresented in the sample of respondents and Oromo are significantly underrepresented, and the Somali group is omitted entirely),³⁰ the WVS data represents the *best* available snapshot of voter partisan preferences in Ethiopia to date.

Based upon the above literature and discussion of current Ethiopian politics, the following four hypotheses are suggested:

H1: Given the nature of ethnic federalism Ethiopian voters will most likely exhibit concentrated support of particular parties when compared to other African states.

H2: Ethiopian voters who are most motivated to seek patronage resources will more likely defect from supporting a co-ethnic party than those who are less motivated to seek patronage resources.

H3: Ethiopian voters will most likely defect from supporting a co-ethnic party based on evaluations of governmental policy performance.

H4: Ethiopian voters who have a stronger sense of ethnic identity are more likely NOT to defect from supporting a co-ethnic party than those who have less sense of ethnic identity.

To address the first hypothesis above, we examine the extent to which a particular ethnic group concentrates its votes on a single party. If ethnic voter preferences align with a particular party, which purportedly represents the interests of that group, then we would expect that the voter support would be more concentrated on a single party than dispersed among several political parties. One way in which to measure the extent to which voter support is dispersed or concentrated is to use the Herfindahl Hirschman Index of Concentration, or

$$HH = \sum p_i^2, \quad (1)$$

where:

p_i = the fractional share of the i^{th} component (in this case the percent market share held by a firm i);

p_i^2 = the square of the i^{th} component;

$\sum p_i^2$ = sum of the squared components.

The measure was originally devised by economists to measure the degree to which markets are monopolized or oligopolized. In addition, this measure has been used to measure the degree of ethnic homogeneity/heterogeneity in a country as well as the extent to which party systems are fractionalized.³¹ In this article, this measure is applied to data from the World

Values Survey for Ethiopia, and the Afrobarometer survey data from the fourth wave (conducted in 2008) for 19 African countries (but not Ethiopia) to measure the extent to which voters from particular ethnic groups were concentrated on a small group of parties or on a single party. The Afrobarometer data are used rather than the WVS data, because other than Ethiopia and Ghana, the WVS did not report the ethnic identity of respondents, whereas the Afrobarometer did report the ethnicity of respondents.

For the purposes of this article, Ethiopia is compared with Nigeria (a federal system in Africa, but unlike Ethiopia, a nonethnic one), Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, and Uganda, African countries with intense interethnic competition, and whose party systems have been cited as corresponding to “ethnicized” politics. These cases were also selected because of the 19 countries in the Afrobarometer database they ranked as high on the Ethnic Polarization Index as did Ethiopia.³² In other words, as with these countries, Ethiopia is faced with the situation of having a few large groups that are in confrontation with one another (as opposed to a highly fragmented country such as Tanzania). Further, all of these countries have had somewhat competitive elections, which make them comparable to Ethiopia. For each country, the vote concentration/dispersion is examined for up to the largest five ethnic groups in the country that exceed at least 5 percent of the total population. In the Ethiopian case (and the Ghanaian and Nigerian as well), there were only four groups that met this criteria (in Ethiopia, the Amhara, Tigray, Oromo, and Somali), but for Kenya, Malawi, and Uganda, the concentration and dispersion of the five largest groups were calculated and reported in Table 1. The concentration/dispersion of the vote was calculated for Ethiopia based on the question “If there were a national election tomorrow, for which party on this list would you vote?” For Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, and Uganda, the question used was “If a presidential election was held tomorrow, which party’s candidate would you vote for?”

Table 1 reports the HH score for each individual group, and the average score for each country. As indicated in Table 1, the level of concentration for Ethiopia (.408) is comparable to the levels of concentration for Ghana (.491), Kenya (.460), and Malawi (.442), and much higher than Uganda (.214) and Nigeria (.129). Upon closer examination of Table 2 (where the scores for individual ethnic groups are rank ordered), the scores for the Amhara and Tigray groups are quite high (at .575 and .523, respectively), whereas the Oromo group scores are low (at only .126). This indicates that the Amhara and Tigray are more likely to concentrate their votes on a single party (that is, a higher level of ethnic bloc voting) than the Oromo, who have a more dispersed pattern of support.

Thus, it would appear that in Ethiopia, at least for the Amhara and Tigray, ethnic groups tend to concentrate their support on single parties, suggesting support for the idea that Amhara and Tigrayan voters vote along ethnic lines. This result is supported by some simple summary statistics from

TABLE 1 Party Vote Concentration Scores

Country (Average Party Vote Concentration Score)	Ethnic Group	Index of Party Vote Concentration Score
Ghana = .491	Ga Adangbe	.411
	Akan	.670
	Ewe	.641
	Mole Dagomba	.241
Kenya = .460	Kikuyu	.178
	Luo	.857
	Luhya	.386
	Kamba	.254
	Kalenjin	.624
	Tumbuka	.671
Malawi = .442	Chewa	.326
	Yao	.321
	Ngoni	.375
	Lomwe	.515
Ethiopia = .408	Amhara	.523
	Tigray	.575
	Oromo	.126
	Somali	Not listed in World Value Survey
Uganda = .214	Muganda	.113
	Munyankole	.424
	Musoga	.244
	Acholi	.108
	Langi	.164
Nigeria = .129	Hausa	.269
	Igbo	.055
	Yoruba	.075
	Ijaw	.117

Sources: *World Values Survey 1981–2008 Official Aggregate V. 20090901* (Madrid: World Values Survey Association, 2009). www.worldvaluessurvey.org; *Afrobarometer*, round 4 (2008). <http://www.afrobarometer.org>.

the WVS data. Of the 557 Amhara respondents in the sample, 82.7 percent (461) supported Amhara parties (particularly the CUD). For Tigrayan voters, the percentage was nearly as high, with 75.7 percent (121) supporting the EPRDF or TPLF. However, for Oromo voters only 50 percent (138) said they would vote for one of the Oromo parties. Thus, although Amhara and Tigray voters appear to express preferences along ethnic lines, Oromo voters did not.

However, what best explains this pattern, particularly for Amhara and Tigrayan voters, the “expectation for patronage,” evaluations of policy performance, or the “ethnic expressive voting” hypothesis? To address the question posed above, a set of multinomial logit models were run for the Amhara and Tigrayan ethnic groups in Ethiopia. Multinomial logit (MNL) is a technique often used in studies of American voters and frequently used to estimate models of voter choice when there are several simultaneous party choices.³³ MNL makes it possible to estimate the probability of choosing one party relative

TABLE 2 Party Vote Concentration Scores, Ordered Most Concentrated on One Party to Least Concentrated on One Party, By Ethnic Group

Ethnic Group	Index of Party Vote Concentration Score
Luo (Kenya)	0.857
Tumbuka (Malawi)	0.671
Akan (Ghana)	0.670
Ewe (Ghana)	0.641
Kalenjin (Kenya)	0.624
Tigray (Ethiopia)	0.575
Amhara (Ethiopia)	0.523
Lomwe (Malawi)	0.515
Munyankole (Uganda)	0.424
Ga Adangbe (Ghana)	0.411
Luhya (Kenya)	0.386
Ngoni (Malawi)	0.375
Chewa (Malawi)	0.326
Yao (Malawi)	0.321
Hausa (Nigeria)	0.269
Kamba (Kenya)	0.254
Musoga (Uganda)	0.244
Mole Dagomba (Ghana)	0.241
Kikuyu (Kenya)	0.178
Langi (Uganda)	0.164
Oromo (Ethiopia)	0.126
Ijaw (Nigeria)	0.117
Muganda (Uganda)	0.113
Acholi (Uganda)	0.108
Yoruba (Nigeria)	0.075
Igbo (Nigeria)	0.055

Sources: *World Values Survey 1981–2008 Official Aggregate V. 20090901* (Madrid: World Values Survey Association, 2009). www.worldvaluessurvey.org; *Afrobarometer*, round 4 (2008). <http://www.afrobarometer.org>.

to the other options simultaneously. The results from MNL models present estimates of the likelihood that a voter chooses a party of the reference category as compared to a partisan alternative. In this article, I treat ethnic partisans as the reference category (Amhara voters expressing a voting preference for an Amhara party). The resulting models for each group show how the independent variables affect the likelihood of being a nonethnic partisan (that is, Amhara voters expressing a preference for non-Amhara parties and Tigrayan voters expressing a preference for non-Tigrayan parties).³⁴ For the purposes of this article, an ethnic partisan in Ethiopia was defined as an individual voter who expressed an intention in the WVS to vote for a co-ethnic party. The co-ethnic parties for Amhara voters included the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD), which was widely supported by Amhara voters, as well as any party that explicitly listed itself as representing the Amhara people (All Amhara People's Organization, but not the EPRDF front organization, the Amhara National Democratic Movement).³⁵ For Tigrayan voters,

the co-ethnic parties were the TPLF and the ruling EPRDF (largely because, for the EPRDF, the core leadership revolved around the TPLF). For Oromo voters, the co-ethnic parties included the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the Oromo Federalist Movement (ODM), the Oromo National Congress (ONC), and the UEDF.³⁶

The independent variables employed include a proxy measure of expectation for patronage, and two questions that act as proxy measures for governmental/policy performance. As a proxy measure of expectation for patronage, one based upon three separate questions that appeared in the WVS was created: (1) Respondents in the WVS were asked the extent to which they were interested in politics (with responses ranging from “extremely interested” to “not at all interested”). The level of interest in politics can be viewed in Ethiopia as an indicator of some degree of ambition. This is especially so given that generally Ethiopians feel that politics should be avoided because it is seen as dangerous. Indeed, a commonly cited Amhara proverb is “keep politics and electricity at a distance”³⁷ Politics, like electricity, can harm you if you get too close to it—thus, given this risk, to express an interest in politics reflects a sense that an individual can derive something from politics that is “worth” this potential risk. (2) Respondents were also asked to describe themselves relative to certain statements. Question A190 asked respondents to describe whether they thought of themselves as someone who thought it was important to be rich (with responses ranging from “very much like me” to “not at all like me,” and (3) question A194 asked respondents whether they thought of themselves as someone who needed to be rewarded for their achievements (with responses ranging from “very much like me” to “not at all like me”).

Using these three items, I coded as a “1” respondents who said they were interested in politics (either extremely or somewhat) AND who thought it was important to be rich (including “very much like me” and “like me” responses) AND who thought it was important to be rewarded for their achievements (including the “very much like me” and “like me” responses) as individuals who were *ambitious* and who saw politics as a potential means to achieve the goals of enrichment and recognition.

Thus, one would expect that Amhara and Oromo individuals, who were more ambitious, might be more willing to opt to vote for the governing party (in this case the EPRDF, that is, NOT their co-ethnic party) out of the expectation for rewards (that is, political patronage—or Hypothesis 2). For the Tigrayan voters, on the other hand, ambitious individuals with an interest in politics should not defect to other parties (given that the EPRDF is the governing party).

Further, two proxy measures of evaluations of policy performance were used, which included whether the respondent had confidence in the current government and whether the respondent was satisfied with the current financial situation of their household.³⁸ Generally, if the policy evaluation

approach is correct (Hypothesis 3), then Amhara and Oromo individuals who were confident in the government and satisfied with their financial situation would be more likely to defect from the ethnic partisan position. Conversely, Tigrayan voters who were less confident in the government and less satisfied with their financial situation should be more likely than those who were confident and satisfied to defect from their ethnic partisan preferences. If the ethnic expressive voting hypothesis is correct, then none of the primary independent variables should be related to voter choices. In other words, for example, Amhara voters would be expected to express a preference for Amhara parties regardless of their expectations for patronage and estimation of the performance of the government.

Another consideration in assessing the impact of ethnicity on expressed partisan preferences is the intensity to which individuals identify with a particular group. Indeed, one might expect that individuals who more intensely identify with an ethnic group would more likely NOT “defect” to alternative parties and would support the co-ethnic party (Hypothesis 4). To measure this, two questions that appeared in the WVS to create a proxy variable for intensity of identity are employed: Question G006 (How proud are you of your nationality?) and question G020 (I see myself as member of my local community). Although the former alone might be an indicator of intensity of identity, the way in which the question is phrased can cause the respondent to confuse a national identity (Ethiopian) with an ethnic group identity (Amhara, Oromo, etc.). Thus, the extent to which the individual agrees with the statement that they see themselves as a member of a local community is also used. If an individual responds that they are extremely proud of their nationality AND also strongly identify with the local community, I take this as an indicator of some degree of strength of ethnic identity.

In addition to the primary explanatory variables that test the three competing explanations for ethnic voting mentioned above, there are also several control variables considered. Class, education, and residency could matter for a number of reasons. Early modernization theory held that development would free individuals from tribal attachments. Hence, respondents with less education and greater ties to the traditional rural economy might be more likely to conform to the regional census. On the other hand, Robert Bates speculated that modernization increased the attraction of ethnicity, in part based on the idea that national identities are a product of modernization (and especially based on the rise of a modernizing intelligentsia).³⁹ Thus, well-educated urban elites may be more likely to vote as ethnic partisans. Although the “modernization” approach might suggest that rural voters would be more likely to vote along ethnic lines, Ishiyama and Fox found that rural voters were also more likely to defect from the ethnic partisan position in expectation of patronage.⁴⁰ Whatever the case, we would expect that there would be differences between rural and urban voters.

TABLE 3 Multinomial Logit Results, Amhara Voters (Reference is Amhara Parties)

	Defect to Tigray Parties (Exp[b])	Defect to Oromo Parties (Exp[b])
Confidence in the government	2.133**** (8.443)	1.119 (3.061)
Level of satisfaction with financial situation of household	0.362*** (1.437)	−0.206 (0.814)
Ambition	0.611 (1.842)	1.557 (4.746)
Strength of identity	−1.137** (0.268)	−0.756 (0.470)
Highest educational level attained	−0.026 (0.974)	0.098 (1.103)
Scale of respondent income	0.366** (1.442)	0.132 (1.141)
Size of town	−0.221 (0.268)	0.247 (1.280)

* $p \leq .10$. ** $p \leq .05$. *** $p \leq .01$. **** $p \leq .001$.

Pseudo $R^2 = .320$; $N = 681$.

To measure these control variables, three questions from the 2005 Ethiopian World Values Survey were employed: the “highest educational level attained” by the respondent; the scale of the incomes of respondents in deciles; and the size of the town of the respondent’s place of residence (broken into eight categories ranging from 1–2000, to 500,000 and over).

Table 3 reports the MNL results for Amhara voters (voters from the previously dominant group), with the first model estimating the likelihood of “defection” from the ethnic partisan position to vote for Tigrayan parties (including the EPRDF) and the second model estimating Amhara defections to Oromo parties. As indicated by the results, the performance variables of the level of confidence in government and the level of satisfaction of the household financial situation were positively and significantly related to the likelihood that an Amhara voter would defect from the ethnic partisan position and express a preference for a Tigrayan party (that is, the EPRDF). This finding would tend to support the policy performance explanation mentioned above (that is, Hypothesis 3) or, alternatively, that respondents defect from the ethnic partisan position based upon their assessment of the performance of the state (with the Exp[b] values indicating that an increased level of confidence in government increased probability of defection by about 8.5 times and that an increased level of satisfaction increased the probability of defection by approximately 44 percent).

The patronage hypothesis, however, is not supported (contrary to Hypothesis 2). Ambitious Amhara individuals who expressed an interest in politics are not more likely to choose Tigrayan parties than are other Amhara. However, the intensity of identity on the part of Amhara voters was negatively and significantly related to the likelihood of defection. Amhara voters who had a very high sense of pride in their nationality and a very strong attachment to their local community were about 77 percent less likely to defect than those who were less proud and less attached to their local community (in support of Hypothesis 4). This result suggests that at least among

TABLE 4 Multinomial Logit Results, Tigray Voters (Reference is Tigray Parties)

	Defect to Amhara Parties (Exp[b])
Confidence in the government	−1.318*** (0.268)
Level of satisfaction with financial situation of household	−0.524** (0.579)
Ambition	0.421 (1.523)
Strength of identity	−0.340 (0.712)
Highest educational level attained	0.138 (1.148)
Scale of respondent income	0.412 (1.510)
Size of town	1.028* (0.402)

* $p \leq .05$. ** $p \leq .01$. *** $p \leq .001$.

Pseudo $R^2 = .303$; $N = 180$.

Amhara respondents, intensity of identity is associated with affiliation with Amhara parties and, at least for the Amhara, provides some support that ethnic identity matters in voter partisan preferences.

The level of education was unrelated to the dependent variable, but social class as measured by the scale of respondent income was related to the ethnic partisan position of the respondent. However, Amhara voters did not defect from the ethnic partisan position to Oromo parties for any reason. Overall, given that the policy voting framework variables were significant, this does not support the ethnic expressive voting hypothesis. Even when considering the intensity of identity, one would think that if the expressive voting hypothesis held, all Amhara would support Amhara parties. However, there was a difference between Amhara who had more intense identities when compared with those with less intense identities. This result does not support the ethnic expressive hypothesis either, which would suggest that all Amhara voters regardless of intensity of identity should support the Amhara parties.

Table 4 reports the MNL results for Tigrayan voters (that is, voters from the currently politically dominant group), with the first model estimating the likelihood of “defection” from the ethnic partisan position to vote for Amhara parties (including the CUD—there were no instances of Tigrayan voters defecting to Oromo parties). Both the performance variables (confidence in the government and level of satisfaction with financial situation of household) were statistically significant and in the predicted direction. Tigrayan voters who view the government’s performance favorably were significantly less likely to defect from the Tigrayan party (EPRDF) and to select an Amhara party—of course, those who were less confident were significantly more likely to defect to the Amhara parties (in support of Hypothesis 3). However, neither the ambition nor the strength of identity variables explained Tigrayan defection to Amhara parties (contrary to Hypotheses 2 and 4, respectively). The other control variables were also generally unrelated to the ethnic partisan position of Tigrayan voters; although urban Tigrayans were more likely to defect. Again, however, as with Amhara voters, there were

TABLE 5 Multinomial Logit Results, Oromo Voters (Reference is Oromo Parties)

	Defect to Amhara Parties (Exp[b])	Defect to Tigray Parties (Exp[b])
Confidence in the government	-0.325 (0.723)	1.014** (2.757)
Level of satisfaction with financial situation of household	0.121 (1.129)	0.234 (1.263)
Ambition	-1.233*** (0.291)	0.309 (0.734)
Strength of identity	0.299 (1.348)	0.782 (2.187)
Highest educational level attained	-0.017 (0.983)	0.009 (1.010)
Scale of respondent income	-0.006 (0.994)	0.187 (1.205)
Size of town	0.583 (1.792)	-0.652 (0.124)

* $p \leq .05$. ** $p \leq .01$. *** $p \leq .001$.

Pseudo $R^2 = .267$; $N = 321$.

factors other than ethnic identity that affected whether a voter defected from the ethnic position.

Finally, in Table 5 we examine the behavior of the Oromo voters (voters from the historically discriminated against group). Again, the variable that best explains voter defection to the Amhara parties was the extent to which Oromo voters had confidence in the current EPRDF-led government. Increasing confidence in the government increased the likelihood of defecting to the Tigrayan party by 275 percent (in support of Hypothesis 3). On the other hand, ambitious voters who had an interest in politics were significantly less likely to defect to the Amhara parties (although this did not translate into ambitious individuals defecting to the EPRDF). In neither case was the strength of identity related to whether or not an Oromo voter opted to defect to support either Amhara or Tigrayan parties (contrary to Hypothesis 4). Thus, again, the Oromo voters who were confident in the government expressed preferences for the governing Tigrayan parties, especially the EPRDF.

CONCLUSIONS

The above findings indicate that, although in Ethiopia, Amhara and Tigrayan voters vote along ethnic lines more so than many other African ethnic groups, the ethnic expressive hypothesis does not really explain Amhara, Tigrayan, or Oromo voter partisan preferences. This finding runs counter to the work that suggests that elections are merely ethnic censuses where the act of voting is an act of affirmation of identity. The findings above further do not support some of the more recent nuanced literature (Bratton and Bhavnani) that argues that that people who belong to the ethnic group in power exhibit ethnic voting (which in Ethiopia would be the Tigray), as do those who feel a sense of discrimination against their cultural group (which would be the Oromo). However, in both the cases of the Tigray and Oromo voters, the

evidence did not support the ethnic expressive hypothesis. Voters expressed preferences based on their evaluation of policy performance (as indicated by the level of confidence in the government) for all three groups.

The results reported above suggest little support for the ethnic expressive voting hypothesis in Ethiopia; a finding that is generally consistent with the growing literature across Africa that have called this hypothesis into question. Further, the findings suggest support for the findings of earlier studies on Ethiopian voters in 2005 that suggested that factors other than ethnicity drove voting.⁴¹ Although generally Amhara voters supported one party in the 2005 electoral campaign (the CUD), a good number of voters, particularly those who had benefitted from the policy performance of the government, were significantly more likely to defect from the ethnic partisan position (and support the EPRDF). For the Tigrayan voters (who generally supported the EPRDF), those who had benefitted from the policy performance of the government were significantly less likely to defect than those who had not benefitted (particularly the CUD). Neither group defected to Oromo parties. Oromo voters also defected away from the primarily Oromo parties, also based on evaluations of policy performance of the EPRDF-led government.

The behavior of Oromo voters is also notable to the extent that they tended not to express voter preferences primarily along ethnic lines. As noted above, Oromo voters tended to disperse their support across a number of different parties. Although this might be due to the fact that there were simply more Oromo parties to choose from (four as opposed to two each for the Amhara and Tigray), the fact that they did not concentrate their support on fewer parties (as was the case for both the Amhara and Tigray) and the fact that significantly fewer Oromo expressed voting preferences along ethnic lines than either the Amhara or Tigrayans suggest an alternative explanation. First, it may be due to the expectations of Oromo voters that none of the Oromo parties really had a chance to gain access to power, and hence there was much less incentive to support “their” parties. For those voters, the EPRDF was a better bet (since it was generally unlikely that the EPRDF would completely leave government and cede all power, even if the opposition won a landslide election in 2005). On the other hand, Oromo voters most dissatisfied with the government did not turn to the CUD as a better choice to represent the opposition than their own parties.

Although a discussion of the results of the 2010 parliamentary election is beyond the scope of this article, the findings in this article, to some extent, help in understanding the results. Even though there was widespread suspicion that the 2010 election had been rigged, to some extent the lopsided result was a direct product of the EPRDF regime’s efforts to buy off opponents and reestablish political control. To a large extent, the 2005 election was a “shock” to the regime and demonstrated that something needed to be done to reestablish its hegemony. In the 2008 local elections (which were supposed to be held in 2005 but were postponed because of the violence),

the regime attempted to reassert control via intimidation and harassment, but also through manipulation and control of resources.⁴² The regime also sought to recruit new members to the EPRDF and its affiliates and to buy off many opposition politicians. After the 2005 election “fiasco,” EPRDF embarked on a massive drive to recruit thousands of new party members. It also expanded economic benefits to new party members, students, and members of the urban middle class, trying to lure them away from CUD. Further, significant economic growth in Ethiopia since 2005 also helped the regime in its efforts to “buy off” supporters of the opposition. Given that there are a number of Amhara and Oromo voters who were responsive to the “performance” of the regime as early as 2005, it is not surprising that these efforts bore fruit in 2010.

Although it has been fashionable to suggest that African politics in general (and Ethiopian politics in particular) is driven primarily by interethnic conflict, and that ethnic politics trumps all other considerations for voters, the findings above suggest otherwise in the Ethiopian case. These conclusions support the findings of some more recent work that suggest a far more complex picture when explaining patterns of ethnic voting in Africa. This is most certainly also the case in Ethiopia, despite the explicit structural ethnification of politics following the adoption of ethnic federalism.

NOTES

1. Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth Shepsle, *Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability* (Columbus, OH: Merrill, 1972).

2. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*.

3. Although some studies have examined the relationship between candidate evaluation and ethnicity in Africa, particularly under the conditions of single-member district systems (see, for example, Barkan), the focus of this article is on the partisan preference of voters. This is because the “outbidding” argument that is commonly found in studies of ethnic politics is based on the supposition that identity with an ethnic political organization (that is, parties) is key in explaining why the ethnification of politics occurs. Joel D. Barkan, “Legislators, Elections and Political Linkage,” in Joel D. Barkan, ed., *Politics and Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania* (New York: Praeger, 1984), 71–101.

4. John Ishiyama and Krystal Fox, “What Affects the Strength of Partisan Identity in Sub-Saharan Africa?” *Politics and Policy* 34(4): 748–773 (2006); Michelle Kuenzi and Gina M. S. Lambright, “Who Votes In Africa? An Examination of Electoral Turnout in 10 African Countries,” *Afrobarometer Working Article* 51:1–28 (2005); Pippa Norris and Robert Mattes, “Does Ethnicity Determine Support for the Governing Party?” *Afrobarometer Working Article* 26:1–22 (2003).

5. Norris and Mattes, “Does Ethnicity,” 1; see also Cyril Daddieh and Jo Ellen Fair, eds., *Ethnicity and Recent Democratic Experiments in Africa* (New Brunswick, NJ: African Studies Association Press, 2002); Mohamed A. Salih and John Markakis, eds., *Ethnicity and the State in Eastern Africa* (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1998).

6. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 291.

7. Letitia Lawson, “External Democracy Promotion in Africa: Another False Start?” *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 37(1): 12 (1999).

8. Robert Mattes, *The Election Book: Judgment and Choice in South Africa's 1994 Election* (Cape Town: Idasa, 1995); Karen Ferree, “Explaining South Africa's Racial Census,” *Journal of Politics* 68(4): 803–815 (2006).

9. Kanchan Chandra, *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
10. Nicolas van de Walle, "Presidentialism and Clientism in Africa's Emerging Party Systems," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 41(2): 313 (2003); Daniel Posner, *Institutions and Ethnic Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
11. Mattes, *Election Book*.
12. Karen Ferree, "The Micro-Foundations of Ethnic Voting: Evidence from South Africa," *Afro-barameter Working Article*, 40:1–23 (2004).
13. Michael Bratton and Ravi Bhavnani, Voting in Africa: Ethnic, Economic, or Strategic? (Paper prepared for presentation at the Seminar on Africa, Department of Political Science, MIT, 19 Nov. 2009), http://web.mit.edu/polisci/research/africa/EthnicEcon_MIT.pdf (accessed March 2010).
14. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*.
15. R. W. Johnson, "The 1994 Election: Outcome and Analysis," in R. W. Johnson and Lawrence Schlemmer, eds., *Launching Democracy in South Africa: The First Open Election, April 1994* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 301–322.
16. Stanley Fish, "When 'Identity Politics' Is Rational," *New York Times*, 14 Feb. 2008.
17. Bratton and Bhavnani, Voting in Africa; Ishiyama and Fox, "What Affects the Strength"; Ferree, "Micro-Foundations."
18. Barkan, "Legislators, Elections and Political Linkage"; Goran Hyden and Colin Leys, "Elections and Politics in Single-Party Systems: The Case of Kenya and Tanzania," *British Journal of Political Science* 2(4): 389–420 (1972).
19. Michael Bratton and Mwangi Kimenyi, "Voting in Kenya: Putting Ethnicity in Perspective," *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 2(2): 272–289 (2008); Daniel Posner and David Simon, "Economic Conditions and Incumbent Support in Africa's New Democracies," *Comparative Political Studies* 35(3): 313–336 (2002).
20. Staffan Lindberg and Minion K.C. Morrison, "Are African Voters Really Ethnic or Clientelistic? Survey Evidence from Ghana," *Political Science Quarterly* 123(1): 95–122 (2008); Jeremy Youde, "Economics and Government Popularity in Ghana," *Electoral Studies* 24(1): 1–16 (2005); Richard Jeffries, "The Ghanaian Elections of 1996: Toward the Consolidation of Democracy?" *African Affairs* 97(3): 189–208 (1998); Mahamadu Bawumia, "Understanding Rural-Urban Voting Patterns in the 1992 Ghanaian Election," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 36(1): 47–70 (1998).
21. Ferree, "Micro-Foundations."
22. Ishiyama and Fox, "What Affects the Strength."
23. Bratton and Bhavnani, Voting in Africa.
24. A notable exception is the work of Leonardo Arriola, who, using limited survey data, argued that economic conditions were a key criterion in the election of 2005 (as opposed to ethnicity) and that "the unemployed and those whose perceived living standard declined over the previous five years were more likely to vote for the opposition, regardless of ethnicity or region." Thus economic issues, rather than ethnic identification, explained the level of support for the opposition in 2005. However, the survey data was limited to primarily Addis Ababa and its immediate surroundings, and his analysis did not employ MNL regression techniques. Leo Arriola, "The Ethiopian Voter: Assessing Economic and Ethnic Influences with Survey Data," *International Journal of Ethiopian Studies* 3(1): 73–90 (2007); see also Leonardo Arriola, "Ethnicity, Economic Conditions, and Opposition Support: Evidence from Ethiopia's 2005 Elections," *Northeast African Studies* 10(1): 115–144 (2008).
25. Central Statistical Agency, *2007 Ethiopian Census, First Draft*, Jan. 2010, http://www.csa.gov.et/pdf/Cen2007_firstdraft.pdf (accessed Jan. 2010).
26. Kidane Mengisteab, "New Approaches to State Building in Africa: The Case of Ethiopia's Ethnic-Based Federalism," *African Studies Review* 40(3): 111–132 (1997); Kidane Mengisteab, "Ethiopia's Ethnic-Based Federalism: 10 Years After," *African Issues* 29(1&2): 20–25 (2001); Edmond Keller and Lahra Smith, "Obstacles to Implementing Territorial Decentralization: The First Decade of Ethiopian Federalism," in Phillip Roeder and Donald Rothchild, eds., *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005); Alem Habtu, "Multiethnic Federalism in Ethiopia: A Study of the Secession Clause in the Constitution," *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 35(2): 313–335 (2005).
27. Paulos Chanie, "Clientelism and Ethiopia's Post-1991 Decentralisation," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 45(3): 355–384 (2007); Paulos Chanie, "Disconnect Between Public Sector Management System and Decentralization Reforms: An Empirical Analysis of the Ethiopian Situation," *Eastern Africa Social Science Research Review* 25(1): 59–91 (2009).

28. Kjetil Tronvoll, "Ambiguous Elections: The Influence of Non-Electoral Politics in Ethiopian Democratisation," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 47(3): 449–474 (2009); Jan Abbink, "Discomfiture of Democracy? The 2005 Election Crisis in Ethiopia and Its Aftermath," *African Affairs* 105(419): 173–199 (2006).
29. There had been a "pre-election" survey conducted by the organization "Initiative Africa" along with two nongovernmental organizations (NGOs; *Addis Ababa Women Entrepreneurs' Association* and *Build Ethiopia*) in March–April 2005, which sampled some 2600 respondents. However, this study concentrated almost exclusively on the largest cities in Ethiopia, and there were a number of reported additional sampling problems with the data. Further, the raw data were never publicly released.
30. Of the 1500 respondents, 557 were identified as Amhara (37.1 percent); 276 were identified as Oromo (18.4 percent); and 160 were identified as Tigray (10.7 percent).
31. Rein Taagepera and Matthew Shugart, *Seats and Votes* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).
32. José G. Montalvo and Marta Reynal-Querol, "Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict, and Civil Wars," *American Economic Review* 95(3): 796–816 (2005).
33. Michael Alvarez and Jonathan Nagler, "When Politics and Models Collide: Estimating Models of Multi-Candidate Elections," *American Journal of Political Science* 42(1): 55–96 (1998); Kevin Quinn, Andrew Martin, and Andrew Whitford, "Voter Choice in Multi-Party Democracies: A Test of Competing Theories and Models," *American Journal of Political Science* 43(4): 1231–1247 (1999).
34. Jay Dow and James W. Endersby, "Multinomial Probit and Multinomial Logit: A Comparison of Choice Models for Voting Research," *Electoral Studies* 23(2): 107–122 (2004).
35. I did not include the Amhara National Democratic Front (ANDF), which was a front organization for the EPRDF. Thus support for the ANDF indicates support for an EPRDF-backed organization, and hence not an instance of Amhara ethnic voting.
36. As with the Amhara front organization of the EPRDF, the Oromo front organization of the EPRDF, the OPDO, was also excluded from the list of "Oromo" parties.
37. Siegfried Pausewang and Kjetil Tronvoll, *The Ethiopian 2000 Elections: Democracy Advanced or Restricted?* (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of Human Rights, 2000), 153.
38. Although it would be far better to use the same variables that Ferree or Arriola did to evaluate policy performance (such as satisfaction over the past five years, for Arriola) such questions were simply not available in the Ethiopian WVS data. Thus I use satisfaction with current financial state of the household and confidence in government as proxies for evaluations of economical and political performance of the state.
39. Robert Bates, "Ethnic Competition and Modernization in Contemporary Africa," *Comparative Political Studies* 6(3): 457–477 (1974).
40. Ishiyama and Fox, "What Affects the Strength."
41. Arriola, "Ethiopian Voter"; Arriola, "Ethnicity."
42. L. Aalen and Kjetil Tronvoll, "The 2008 Ethiopian Local Elections: The Return of Electoral Authoritarianism," *African Affairs* 108(430): 111–120 (2009).

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